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JOHN H. FANNING LABOR LAW WRITING
COMPETITION WINNER
THE WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND
RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT OF
1988: ADVANCE NOTICE
REQUIRED?
Millions of American workers became unemployed as a result of plant
closings and permanent mass layoffs in the past decade.' Employees and
communities experienced difficulty in adjusting to these losses.2 Regardless
of the cause, such massive employment cutbacks profoundly affected indi-
viduals, communities, and states.3 In addition to severe emotional and phys-
ical problems, displaced workers often experienced lengthy unemployment
and reduced income.' Communities realized the effects of employer shut-
downs through decreased revenues.5 States confronted with increased un-
employment levels also assumed additional financial burdens.6 The situation
1. Eleven and one-half million workers lost their jobs due to plant closings and mass
layoffs between 1979 and 1983. See Flaim & Sehgal, Displaced Workers of 1979-83: How Well
Have They Fared?, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1985, at 3. More recent estimates indicate
that from 1981 to 1985, an additional 2.2 million workers lost their jobs annually. See
Horvath, The Pulse of EcOnomic Change.- Displaced Workers of 1981-85, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., June 1987, at 3; see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
PLANT CLOSINGS: ADVANCE NOTICE AND RAPID RESPONSE 5 (Dec. 1986) [hereinafter OTA
SPECIAL REPORT].
2. See Kay & Griffin, Plant Closures. Assessing the Victims' Remedies, 19 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 199, 201-04 (1983) (illustrating a brief summary of the social and economic conse-
quences of increasing capital divestment).
3. See Note, Advance Notice of Plant Closings: Toward National Legislation, 14 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 283, 285-88 (1981) (provides a thorough accounting of the effects of plant closings on
workers, communities, and states).
4. Of the workers dislocated between 1979 and 1984, one-fourth remained unemployed
for a year or more. See OTA SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 (citing OFFICE OF TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, TECHNOLOGY AND STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT:
REEMPLOYING DISPLACED ADULTS (Feb. 1986)). These economic stresses consequently af-
fect the mental and physical health of workers. Id.
5. See Bartholomew, Joray & Kochanowski, Corporate Relocation Impact.- South Bend,
IND. BUs. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1977, at 2, 6-7 (examines the economic impact (reduced food and
rental expenditures, reduced sale of consumer durables, and reduced purchase and financing of
new homes) on a community resulting from a shutdown of a 500-worker plant).
6. States realize additional financial burdens in terms of increased unemployment com-
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was exacerbated because very few employers disclosed their decision to sig-
nificantly reduce or cease operations in advance, thus leaving workers and
communities without an opportunity to adjust and plan for the impending
dislocation.7 The unmitigated transitional effects on the economy and the
workforce drew increased public attention to the problem.'
The concept of providing workers and their communities with advance
notification of an employer's decision to withdraw or scale back operations
appeared simple enough. Virtually every sector of society recognized the
benefits of advance notice.9 Although it became apparent that advance no-
tice constituted a critical element in structuring an effective and comprehen-
sive national policy to foster acceptance and adjustment to changing
economic conditions,'° unions, states, and the federal government struggled
with attempts to mandate it.
Workers and communities lacked protection against such dislocations at
the state and local levels and in the collective bargaining context." At the
federal level, Congress only succeeded in strongly encouraging the use of
advance notification.' 2 Clearly, employers responded to the concept unfa-
vorably. ' An extensive fifteen year legislative history reflected congres-
sional efforts to mandate advance notice of plant closings or mass layoffs. 4
Increased public pressure and support contributed significantly to the en-
actment of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the
pensation and public assistance. See Note, supra note 3, at 287-88 & nn.25-27 (citing R. AR-
ONSON & R. MCKERSIE, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PLANT SHUTDOWNS IN NEW YORK
STATE 140 (1980)).
7. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PLANT CLOSINGS: LIMITED ADVANCE No-
TICE AND ASSISTANCE PROVIDED DISLOCATED WORKERS 34-39 (July 1987) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT].
8. Millspaugh, State and Local Plant Closing Laws Confront Constitutional Hurdles,
1984 DET. C.L. REV. 615-16.
9. See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 30-32; see also 134 CONG. REC. S8375 (daily ed.
June 22, 1988) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum citing broad support).
10. TASK FORCE ON ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND WORKER DISLOCATION, DEP'T OF
LABOR, REPORT ON ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND WORKER DISLOCATION IN A COMPETI-
TIVE SOCIETY 22 (Dec. 1986) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
11. See Note, A Legal, Economic, and Normative Analysis of National Plant Closing Legis-
lation, 11 J. OF LEGIS. 348, 350-55 (1984) (examines private and state attempts to address the
plant closing problem).
12. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
13. See 134 CONG. REC. S8376 (daily ed. June 22, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy,
including discussion on ineffectiveness of voluntary system of advance notice); cf id. at S8451-
52 (statement of Sen. Hatch indicating employer practice of providing voluntary advance no-
tice increasing).
14. See OTA SPECIAl. REPORT, supra note I, at 41 (noting that advance notice legislation
has been introduced in every Congress since 1973).
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WARN Act or Act).'" The decreased intrusiveness of the Act's language,
however, also played an important role in its passage.' 6 Substantially modi-
fied from earlier proposals, the Act represents a compromise in political ide-
ologies.' 7 The final language clearly reflects the influence of business,
industry, and labor groups.18 Ironically, Congress spent minimal time form-
ing the basic provision of sixty days' advance notice compared with the time
it devoted to excluding employers from mandatory compliance.' 9
This Note first explores the historical foundation of the concept of ad-
vance notification and its use in the United States. Next, it discusses the
theory supporting advance notice and the need to mandate it through federal
legislation. Following an overview of the Act, this Note analyzes provisions
which limit its coverage. Further, this Note recognizes several interpretive
difficulties inherent in the Act's provisions, and the resulting potential for
litigation. Finally, this Note concludes that, in light of language reducing
employee protection, the courts should rely on the original legislative intent
driving enactment of the WARN Act: that workers should possess the right
to advance notice of a plant closing or permanent mass layoff.
I. ADVANCE NOTICE: BEFORE THE WARN ACT
A. The Need for Mandatory Advance Notice Legislation
Plant closings and mass layoffs constituted an integral part of the rapidly
changing American labor economy. 2° As a result, the concept of advance
notification quickly developed in America. 2' Government agencies, legal
scholars, business associations, economic think tanks, and organized labor
15. Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109)
[hereinafter the WARN Act or Act].
16. For example, one Congressman who previously opposed advance notice legislation
with comprehensive employer disclosure requirements supported the Act because of its more
moderate provisions. See 134 CONG. REC. H5516-17 (daily ed. July 13, 1988) (statement of
Rep. Bereuter).
17. Id. at H5509 (statement of Rep. Ford indicating the Act's accomodation of employer
interests).
18. Id.
19. Congressional debate seldom focused on the basic notion of 60 days' advance notice,
but rather concentrated on exceptions, exclusions, and reductions in coverage. See, e.g., 134
CONG. REC. S8855-57 (daily ed. July 6, 1988) (debate over Sen. Wilson's amendment to pro-
vide an exception from the notice requirements for employers unable to obtain necessary
materials).
20. Worker dislocations result from the everyday business operations of companies re-
sponding to market forces, including new technology, increase and decline in demand and
production capacity. See OTA SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
21. As early as 1973, legislation requiring advance notice was introduced in Congress.
See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
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groups developed a wealth of information devoted to this subject during the
past decade.22 Until very recently, however, no formal statistics indicated
the magnitude of the dislocation problem.23
In the five year period covering 1979-1983, over eleven million workers
lost their jobs due to plant closings and relocations. 24 The Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) reported no significant decrease in recent years; over two
million workers continued to lose their jobs annually.25 Within this context,
the manufacturing sector accounted for sixty percent of the dislocations at
establishments employing 100 or more workers. 26 Plant closings and perma-
nent mass layoffs occurred in thirteen percent of the nation's larger manu-
facturing establishments.27 Moreover, the problem, once regionally based,
now extends across the entire nation.28
Further examination of the characteristics of plant closings and mass lay-
offs reveals that over fifty percent of the employers experiencing a closure or
mass layoff in 1983 or 1984 were at their sites fifteen years or more.29 In
fact, only six percent were in business four years or less. 3° Thus, reduced
employment levels reflected long term trends in certain industrial sectors,
rather than the instability and inexperience of young companies.3 '
22. See OTA SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1 (providing an in-depth examination, supple-
mented by specific case studies, of advance notice issues, including the costs and benefits asso-
ciated with employer advance notification); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 7 (detailed
accounting of the extent of closures and layoffs and the amount of notice provided to those
workers affected); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10 (a comprehensive report on the overall
system of employee and community adjustment to plant closings and mass layoffs).
23. See OTA SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at I (citing a General Accounting Office
survey of employers nationwide as the first statistically reliable information on advance notice
practices).
24. See Flaim & Sehgal, supra note 1. Also cited as reasons for the dislocations were
increased productivity levels and declining output. Id. at 16. Ironically, a substantial number
of employees lost their jobs during a period of economic growth. See OTA SPECIAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 5.
25. See Horvath, supra note 1.
26. In 1983 and 1984, one out of eight of the nation's 35,000 larger manufacturing estab-
lishments experienced a plant closing or mass layoff. See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 21.
This represented employment losses for 688,000 workers. Id.
27. Id. at 22.
28. Id. at 18. The tendency to associate plant closings and mass layoffs with the tradition-
ally industrial sectors of the nation (the Midwest and North) is not supported by current data.
Id. In fact, the West South-Central region accounted for the highest percentage of closings
and layoffs during that period. Id.
29. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PLANT CLOSINGS: INFORMATION ON AD-
VANCE NOTICE AND ASSISTANCE TO DISLOCATED WORKERS 5 (table 2) (Apr. 1987) [herein-
after GAO BRIEFING REPORT].
30. Id.
31. Id.
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In the Trade Act of 1974,32 Congress strongly encouraged employers to
provide at least sixty days' advance notice of a facility closing or reloca-
tion.3 3  However, the provision's non-mandatory nature rendered it
ineffective.34
Statistics on the amount of advance notice given voluntarily or in compli-
ance with a collective bargaining agreement revealed the inadequacy of the
previous system.3' Employers provided no notice in over thirty percent of
the mass dislocation events.36 Of those employers who did announce their
decision to reduce or cease operations, the median notice period was seven
days,3 7 and fewer than twenty percent provided more than thirty days' no-
tice.38 Clearly, most employers about to shut down or transfer operations
did not view the concept of advance notice as a priority.
Business, industry, labor, and government all agreed on the potential ben-
efits of providing advance notice to workers prior to their dislocation.39
However, mandatory imposition of advance notice still caused vigorous ob-
jections.4 Critics raised arguments of economic inefficiency; cost; possible
loss of customers, credit and valued employees; as well as increased friction
in labor-management relations.4 Proponents countered with equally com-
32. 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1982).
33. Id. § 2394(1). The section specifically provides that employers relocating abroad
should notify affected employees at least 60 days prior to the move, and similarly notify the
Departments of Labor and Commerce. Id. § 2394(l)-(2).
34. See OTA SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 42. The Department of Labor informed
the Office of Technology Assessment that it was unaware of any firms providing formal notice
to the Department of their plans to relocate as encouraged in the Trade Act of 1974. Id.
35. See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 34-39.
36. Id. at 34.
37. Id. Effective worker adjustment assistance programs require a lengthier notice period.
Apart from the effect on employees of such an abrupt change, government assistance programs
generally do not become operational for weeks, if not months. Id. Delays of three or more
months are not uncommon. Id. (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DISLOCATED
WORKERS: LOCAL PROGRAMS AND OUTCOMES UNDER THE JOBS TRAINING PARTNERSHIP
ACT (Mar. 1987)).
38. Id. Clearly, this figure does not meaningfully reflect the 60 days' advance notice rec-
ommended in the Trade Act of 1974. Id.
39. Id. at 30-32. The Conference Board, Business Roundtable, AFL-CIO, Committee for
Economic Development, National Association of Manufacturers, and National Center on Oc-
cupational Readjustment all recognized that advance notice provides a significant opportunity
for employees to adjust, thus maximizing their employment potential and permitting employ-
ers to implement the closing or layoff with minimal negative consequences. Id. at 31 (table
3.1).
40. See id. at 30. It appears that the "mandatory" nature of such a provision is more
repugnant to employers than the general concept of providing employees advance notice. Id.
41. See McKenzie, The Case for Plant Closures, 15 POL'Y REv. 119 (1981) (arguing that
corporate mobility is essential to private economic growth and proponents of mandatory plant
closing legislation fail to realize the beneficial aspects of the free flow of economic resources).
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pelling arguments.42 At the same time, the General Accounting Office and
the Office of Technology Assessment formulated reports on the subject in
response to congressional inquiry.43 These agencies documented the impact
on workers and communities receiving little or no advance notice." Studies
showed the profound economic, psychological, and physical effects on work-
ers.45 A profile of the average dislocated worker in this context reflected
older, less educated, high-seniority employees with skills not easily transfera-
ble to positions with comparable compensation.46 As a result, most workers
experienced difficulty adjusting to the sudden loss of earnings and often
lengthy unemployment.4 7
Communities underwent severe losses as well.48 Plant closings dramati-
cally reduced municipal tax bases and local businesses experienced the ef-
fects through decreased demand for products and services.4 9 This
subsequently resulted in additional employment cutbacks.5 °
Most authorities contend that advance notice plays only a partial role in
successfully offsetting the effects of plant closings and mass layoffs.51 Effec-
tive adjustment assistance programs become a necessary supplement to ad-
vance notice in an efficient transition.52 The Secretary of Labor's Task
Force on Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation in a Competitive
Society (Secretary of Labor's Task Force) emphasized the importance of ad-
42. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA 235-43
(1982); Note, supra note 3, at 291-94.
43. The General Accounting Office identified the scope of the worker dislocation problem
in the United States and found that the amount of advance notice being provided at that time
was insufficient to implement effective employee adjustment assistance. See GAO REPORT,
supra note 7, at 34. The Office of Technology Assessment further examined the benefits and
costs associated with providing advance notice of a plant closing or mass layoff and concluded
that even though the arguments supporting and objecting to advance notice persist, it does
facilitate effective displaced worker programs and it is a humane thing to do. See OTA SPE-
CIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-4.
44. See OTA SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
45. The abrupt halt in the flow of earnings, subsequent lapse of time before the worker
gains reemployment, and ultimately reduced income level all create depression, domestic tur-
moil, and a host of medical problems for workers. See Kay & Griffin, supra note 2, at 202-04;
Note, supra note 3, at 285-86.
46. NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF BUSINESS, WORKER ADJUSTMENT TO PLANT SHUT-
DOWNS AND MASS LAYOFFS: AN ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM EXPERIENCE AND POLICY OP-
TIONS ch. 2, at 15-18 (Aug. 1981); see also Note, supra note 3, at 285-86.
47. See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 38.
48. Lost profits of local businesses, declining property values, and diminished tax revenues
reflect some of the negative effects on communities. See Note, supra note 3, at 287-88.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 22-23.
52. Consequently, the concept of advance notice becomes necessary to a comprehensive
program meant to address mass dislocations. Id.
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vance notice as a prerequisite to successful adjustment programs.5 3 Even
some employers recognized the benefits associated with early notification.5 4
Timing is a critical factor in the coordination of a large displacement.
When an employer provides significant advance notice, the employer, labor
representative, community, and employees have an opportunity to plan their
adjustment.55 This increases worker participation in assistance programs
and lessens the psychological impact on individual workers.56 A recent
study concluded that eight weeks of advance notice may decrease unemploy-
ment for each employee by 2.9 weeks.57 Notification may also allow the
union and local officials to meet with the employer to work out possible
alternatives to the measure proposed.5" Various other benefits of advance
notification have received commentary and support.5 9
Those opposing advance notice object to the economic inefficiency result-
ing from a strain on capital mobility as the concept's main defect.60 In the
53. Id.
54. BERENBEIM, CONFERENCE BOARD, REP. No. 878, COMPANY PROGRAMS TO EASE
THE IMPACT OF SHUTDOWNS 7-8 (1986) (improved productivity reflected the positive aspects
of advance notice, including higher participation in worker adjustment programs, increased
cooperation between labor and management, and reduced psychological anxiety among
employees).
55. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 22; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 7,
at 30.
56. See Note, supra note 3, at 293.
57. SWAIM & PODGURSKY, ADVANCE NOTICE AND JOB SEARCH: THE VALUE OF AN
EARLY START 16 (Feb. 1989) (presentation at Eastern Economic Association Meetings) (pro-
viding a statistical analysis of the effect that pre-displacement notification may have in acceler-
ating reemployment).
58. See Note, supra note 3, at 291-92. Within this framework, employee wage and benefit
concessions and municipal tax incentives might be explored, as well as assisting the employee
in identifying potential buyers or even formulating an employee buy-out plan. Id.
59. For additional arguments in favor of requiring advance notice of plant closings or
mass layoffs, see B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 42 (identifying federal plant
closing legislation as crucial to domestic reindustrialization); Klare, Workplace Democracy &
Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 55-56 (1988)
(advance notice is an essential element in enhancing an employee's confidence and trust in his
employer, thus fostering job and income security necessary to a "democracy-enhancing labor
law"); Note, supra note 11, at 371-72 (1984) (employers should assume greater social and
economic responsibility for plant closings); Note, supra note 3, at 291-94 (1981) (citing the
extensive planning opportunities for workers, communities, and businesses from advance noti-
fication; the ability of employees to seek other employment; and arguments of economic effi-
ciency and fairness).
60. This argument contends that the inefficient allocation of resources caused by advance
notice requirements will ultimately result in companies relocating in foreign countries. See
Note, supra note 3, at 294-96. One commentator argues that mandatory employee benefits,
such as advance notice, create a disproportionate allocation of resources within labor markets,
thereby stunting employment growth rather than enhancing job security. See Kosters, Man-
dated Benefits - On the Agenda, REGULATION No. 3, 1988, at 21, 24.
1989]
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absence of experience under prior mandatory federal advance notice laws,
such predictions remain speculative. However, comprehensive adjustment
assistance programs exist in other countries, such as Canada, Japan, and
West Germany. 61 Foreign experience shows that advance notification con-
stitutes an essential element of the successful reemployment of dislocated
workers and facilitates industry and community acceptance of the transi-
tion.62 As a result, the Secretary of Labor's Task Force concluded that ex-
isting labor notification practices did not substantiate employer's fears
regarding advance notification.63
Another recently conducted study concluded that extensive costs will ac-
company a mandatory advance notice statute.64 It estimated a 3.6 billion
dollar increase in employer costs over a two-year period from such a require-
ment.65 However, the General Accounting Office recently evaluated the
methodology and conclusions reached in this report and found them largely
without merit.
66
In light of inadequate protection at the federal and state levels, as well as
in the collective bargaining arena, pressure began to mount for Congress to
enact mandatory advance notice legislation. 67 While many believe that or-
ganized labor composed the sole motivating force, polls indicated that
eighty-six percent of the American people supported such a measure.6 8
B. Advance Notice in a Collective Bargaining Context
Collective bargaining negotiations may have represented the most accessi-
ble method for employees and unions to exercise input on future employer
61. The Secretary of Labor's Task Force examined these policies in some detail. See
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 20-22.
62. Id. at 20.
63. Id. at 23.
64. ROBERT R. NATHAN Assoc., INC., THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR COSTS OF
PROPOSED MANDATORY ADVANCE NOTIFICATION LEGISLATION 2-3 (1988). This study
bases its findings on the added administrative costs of the employer, the potential employer
penalties, and the resulting talent drain caused by a mandatory advance notice law. Id. at 3.
The study also cites indirect employer costs incurred from legal expenses and the potential
negative impact on productivity, sales, and future financial leverage. Id. Further, it contains a
comparative analysis of the overall economic effects of mandatory advance notice and con-
cludes that the resulting decreased employer mobility will cause slower employment growth
and higher unemployment. Id. at 29-33.
65. Id. at 18-28.
66. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PLANT CLOSINGS: EVALUATION OF COST ES-
TIMATE OF PROPOSED ADVANCE NOTICE REQUIREMENT (Mar. 1988).
67. See 134 CONG. REC. S8375 (daily ed. June 22, 1988) (Sen. Metzenbaum cites over-
whelming support from public and major newspaper endorsements).
68. See 134 CONG. REC. S8865 (daily ed. July 6, 1988).
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decisions to close a plant or relocate work.6 9 As of 1986, however, organ-
ized labor represented only eighteen to twenty percent of the private Ameri-
can workforce.7" While some agreements negotiated on behalf of employees
contained provisions calling for advance notice of such employer action,7 1 a
recent study indicates that only thirteen percent of the collective bargaining
agreements analyzed provide for plant closing notification.7 2 Further, the
recent decline of union bargaining leverage in traditionally management con-
trolled issues decreases their ability to obtain adequate protection.7 3
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)74 governs collective bargain-
ing over plant closings, relocations, and mass layoffs by creating a duty to
bargain over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment."7 5 When a plant operates under a collective bargaining agreement,
courts consistently hold that a decision to cease business operations is within
the employer's discretion. 76 However, partial closings require a slightly dif-
ferent analysis. The terms of the NLRA may be interpreted to impose on
employers the duty to consult unions and bargain over the partial closing
decision.7 7
The substantive terms to be discussed during bargaining further define the
extent of the duty to bargain.7" Regardless of whether partially or com-
69. See Note, supra note 11, at 350-53. Because 15 years of federal legislation had not
resulted in mandatory advance notice and very few states were successful in enacting such a
policy, collective bargaining became attractive to those attempting to obtain such protection.
Id. at 350-55.
70. See Lynch, Restrictions on Management's Right to Dismiss Workers by Means of Plant
Closings or by Workforce Reductions, the Relations Between Employers and Public Authorities,
and the Role of Collective Bargaining in the United States, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 227,
228 (1986).
71. Id.
72. [BASIC PATTERNS] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOT. & CONT. (BNA) § 65:3, at 37
(Mar. 9, 1989). BNA maintains files consisting of more than 3000 collective bargaining agree-
ments out of which a sample of 400 were drawn for this analysis. Id. § 32:21, at 79 (Sept. 11,
1986). In addition, the analysis indicated that less than five percent of the agreements con-
tained provisions for employee job placement and training. Id. § 65:3, at 37 (Mar. 9, 1989).
73. See Hofstetter & Klubeck, Accommodating Labor and Community Interests in Mass
Dismissals: A Transnational Approach, 9 INDUS. REL. L.J. 451, 466-67 (1987); see, e.g., Otis
Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 893 (1984) (the Board held that decisions affecting the
"scope, direction, or nature of the business" are not mandatory subjects of bargaining).
74. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Generally, an employer may not unilaterally institute changes
regarding such mandatory subjects of bargaining before good faith bargaining with the union
results in an impasse. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
76. See Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1965).
77. See, e.g., Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. at 893-94 (the Board noted that the critical
factor in determining whether a partial closing decision is subject to the duty to bargain is
whether the decision is based on traditional business interests or solely on labor costs).
78. The Supreme Court's analysis of the employer's duty to bargain distinguishes "deci-
19891
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pletely ceasing operations, the employer has a duty to bargain over the
effects of the change.7 9 On the other hand, no such duty attaches to the
employer's decision to change business operations.8"
In Arrow Automotive Industries v. NLRB,8 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that "bargaining over management
decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of em-
ployment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management rela-
tions and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on
the conduct of the business."8 The court emphasized protection of manage-
rial decision-making, thereby narrowing the meaning of "other terms and
conditions of employment."'8 3 The effects of an employer's decision to sig-
nificantly change operations remain the sole class of issues subject to consist-
ently enforceable mandatory bargaining.
Mandatory bargaining over the effects of a closing or relocation requires
prior notification to the union.84 Because the courts declined to mandate a
specific time in advance of the change by which notice must be given, the
doors may conceivably close the following day.85 This fails to accomplish
sion bargaining" from "effects bargaining." Decision bargaining relates to the employer's duty
to bargain over the decision to make the operational change. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 218, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Effects bar-
gaining relates to bargaining over matters of employee job security that the operational change
will alter (e.g., severance pay, health benefits, transfer rights, and pensions). See, e.g., First
Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677 n.15, 681 (1981). For an analysis of the
distinction, see Note, NLRA Preemption of State and Local Plant Relocation Laws, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 407, 410-13 (1986).
79. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 681 ("There is no dispute that the union must be
given a significant opportunity to bargain about these matters of job security as part of the
"effects" bargaining mandated by § 8(A)(5) [of the NLRA]."); see also Note, supra note 78, at
413.
80. See Note, supra note 78, at 410-12. In Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. 203,
the Court stated that its decision should not
be understood as imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial
decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. Decisions concerning the
commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise are not in
themselves primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of the deci-
sion may be necessarily to terminate employment.
Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
81. 853 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1988).
82. Id. at 226 (quoting First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 679).
83. Id. at 225-28.
84. Logically, an employer must give the union actual notice of the change in operations
for the union to enjoy the prescribed "significant opportunity to bargain." First Nat'l Mainte-
nance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 (1981).
85. See, e.g., Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 1138, 1143-44 (7th Cir. 1983) (no advance notice
required), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984); Creasey Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 1425, 1426 (1984)
(three days' notice sufficient).
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the objective of advance notice, namely, to minimize disruption by providing
workers a period of adjustment. A recent study of 100 major collective bar-
gaining agreements by the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO
reflects organized labor's inability to provide workers with substantive pro-
tection in this area. 6 Thus, collective bargaining also has proved inadequate
to ensure that employees receive advance notice of their impending disloca-
tion. This condition results from the judicial interpretation of the em-
ployer's duty to bargain in the NLRA as well as the union's decrease in
negotiating leverage.8 7
C. State Responses to Plant Closings and Relocations
Previous failures to enact plant closing notice legislation at the federal
level forced advocates to redirect their focus toward state legislatures.8 "
Although many states considered legislation governing notification of plant
closings and relocations, 9 only a few enacted such provisions.9" Most state
bills focused on the employer's decision to shut down or relocate, or sug-
gested alternatives to offset the effects of the closing.9 Consequently, state
plant closing statutes imposed minimal notification requirements on employ-
ers under narrow circumstances, and state authorities unenthusiastically en-
forced even these provisions.92 A South Carolina law represents the more
lenient end of the notification spectrum, simply requiring employers to post
in the workplace at least two weeks' advance notice of a shutdown, but only
86. INDUSTRIAL UNION DEP'T, AFL-CIO, COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF MAJOR COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS - MANUFACTURING AND NON-MANUFACTURING 162-75
(Nov. 1984). Specifically, only 15% of the contracts contained a provision requiring advance
notice of a plant closing to the union, and 31% required notification of a permanent layoff. Id.
In addition, just three percent of the collective bargaining agreements surveyed contained a
provision which allows the formation of a special co-union committee in the event of a future
plant closing. Id.
87. See Lynch, supra note 70, at 232.
88. See Millspaugh, supra note 8, at 617.
89. As of July 1984, nearly 40 state legislatures had introduced advance notice legislation.
See Butterfield, Law on Plant Closings is Signed in Massachusetts, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1984,
at A21, col. 4. More recently, 18 states focused attention on the issue of plant closings and
relocations in their 1988 legislative sessions. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, PLANT
CLOSINGS: THE COMPLETE RESOURCE GUIDE 41 (1988) [hereinafter BNA SPECIAL RE-
PORT]. For an example of the politics involved in motivating enactment of mandatory state
advance notice legislation, see Kay & Griffin, supra note 2, at 212-15 (discussing the history of
Oregon's attempt to enact a plant closing measure in 1981).
90. Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Wisconsin currently comprise the list of states with some form of advance
notice statute. See BNA SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 89, at 35-41.
91. See Millspaugh, supra note 8, at 618-21.
92. See Hofstetter & Klubeck, supra note 73, at 470-72 (providing a thorough discussion
of impact of state legislation on this issue).
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if the employer requires the employees to give notice of their intention to
quit.93 In addition, the statute does not apply to closings that result from
unforeseeable accidents or natural disasters.9 4 Violators face a maximum
penalty of $5,000 and damages to each aggrieved employee.9"
Maine's statute represents the other end of the spectrum, requiring that
employers of 100 or more employees give sixty days' notice of plant reloca-
tions to employees and community officials.9 6 Mandatory employee sever-
ance pay benefits supplement the notice provision.9 7 The Maine statute also
imposes civil violations and fines of $500 for noncompliance with the dislo-
cation provisions.98 But, like the South Carolina statute, the Maine law ex-
empts the employer if an unforeseen circumstance or a natural disaster
precipitates the closing.99 Although the Maine Supreme Court upheld the
notice provision," it loosely interprets the law.' A comparable Wisconsin
statute further exemplifies the current implementation of state plant closing
laws.'0 2 Along with an arguably negligible enforcement mechanism, a fed-
eral court recently ruled that the language of the Wisconsin act did not cre-
ate a private cause of action. 0 3
Other responses include state or local attempts to guarantee their invest-
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-40 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B(6-A) (1988); see also WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 109.07 (West 1988). The Wisconsin provision also requires employers to provide 60 days'
advance notice to local officials and employees in the event of a business decision to terminate
operations. Id. § 109.07(1).
97. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B(2) (1988). Recently, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Maine severance pay statute in Fort Halifax Packing
Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987). The Court found the law a valid exercise of the state's police
power and not preempted by federal law. Id. at 19.
98. Title 26, § 625-B(6-A).
99. Id. "[N]o forefeiture may be adjudged if the relocation is necessitated by a physical
calamity, or if the failure to give notice is due to unforeseen circumstances." Id.
100. Shapiro Bros. Shoe Co. v. Lewiston-Auburn Shoeworkers Protective Ass'n, 320 A.2d
247 (Me. 1974). The Maine Supreme Court similarly found the advance notice statute a con-
stitutional exercise of the state's police power. Id. at 254-55. The court held that the statute
did not constitute a taking of property without just compensation or an exercise in invidious
discrimination against employers who voluntarily cease business operations. Id. at 254-57.
101. See, e.g.. Curtis v. Lehigh Footwear, Inc., 516 A.2d 558 (Me. 1986) (no legislative
intent found to extend liability for violation to shareholders of parent company). This notion
might also be inferred from the historically dismal employer compliance with the Maine stat-
ute. See Hofstetter & Klubeck, supra note 73, at 471-72.
102. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 109-07 (West 1988). The provision is enforced through imposi-
tion of a misdeameanor and fine of $50 per affected employee. Id. § 109.07(2). Subsequently,
employers have little incentive to comply with the terms of the provision. See Hofstetter &
Klubeck, supra note 73, at 472; Note, supra note 3, at 289 n.37.
103. Henne v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1464, 1483 (E.D. Wis. 1987).
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ment in employers through penalties for improper plant closings or remov-
als. '" Also, state laws exist that mandate continuance of health benefits to
certain employees. 1 5
Because of the significant community disruption accompanying a closing
or mass layoff, efforts to regulate notification also appeared at the local
level. ' 6 A Pennsylvania court recently struck down the forerunner of local
advance notice regulations, Pittsburgh Ordinance 21, as a violation of Penn-
sylvania's home rule statute.
10 7
State and local action regulating advance notice of plant closings and mass
layoffs might be impeded for a variety of reasons. Scholars advance consti-
tutional arguments, based on the commerce and contract clauses, 10 8 as well
as economic arguments based on state policy to attract and retain busi-
ness.' 0 9 Others argue that the NLRA should preempt certain state and local
plant closing legislation." 0 To date, efforts to inject a mandatory advance
104. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.601 (West 1967) (imposes sanctions on
employers who cease business within the state "without repaying and restoring any and all
money, bonds, lands and other property, which have been or shall hereafter be given or
granted as a consideration or inducement for the location . . . [of the establishment]"). A
variety of other state laws exist that regulate plant closings and permanent layoffs. For exam-
ple, in Massachusetts, the definition of advance notification encourages employers to volunta-
rily provide workers and unions notice of their decisions to cease operations. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 151A, § 71A (West 1989). However, it also mandates employer notification
to the designated state agency of a closing or partial closing, and upon certification as such,
creates state reemployment assistance for affected employees. Id. § 71D. Tennessee also re-
cently enacted a provision requiring notification to employees and the state of any workforce
reduction of 50 or more employees within a three-month period, excluding those reductions at
a temporary facility or those resulting from a labor dispute or seasonal factors. TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-1-601 to 604 (1989). Although the Tennessee law is comprehensive, it fails to
specify exactly how much notice is required. Id. Finally, Hawaii inserted a 45-day mandatory
notification requirement in its Dislocated Workers Act with violations punishable by payments
of up to three months' wages and benefits per affected employee. HAw. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9, 394B-9, 394B-12 (Michie 1988).
105. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51(o) (West 1985 & Supp. 1988).
106. See PITTSBURGH, PA., ORDINANCE 21, § 5 (July 5, 1983), reprinted in Smaller Mfrs.
Council v. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. Commw. 533, 537, 485 A.2d 73, 77 (1984).
107. Smaller Mfrs. Council v. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. Commw. 533, 485 A.2d 73 (1984). The
Home Rule Statute proscribes municipal authority to impose felony or misdemeanor sanc-
tions. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-302(a)(9) (Purdon Supp. 1988). Because noncompliance
with Pittsburgh Ordinance 21 was a misdemeanor, that provision was held invalid. Smaller
Mfrs. Council, 85 Pa. Commw. at 535, 485 A.2d at 75. The ordinance also violated § 1-302(d),
which limits municipal authority to determine the duties and responsibilities of businesses and
employers through taxes and penalties. Id. at 537, 485 A.2d at 77.
108. See Millspaugh, supra note 8, at 625-32 (an analysis of the potential constitutional
issues); Note, supra note 11, at 353-55 (commerce and contract clause arguments examined).
109. See Note, supra note 11, at 353 (a brief discussion of the pressure on states to abstain
from imposing any measures not conducive to business' interests).
110. See generally Note, supra note 78 (concluding that states mandating advance notice
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notice provision into the mainstream of state labor policy have been largely
unsuccessful. Minimal employer incentives and the noted reluctance of
courts to strictly enforce these laws make them ineffective.
II. HISTORY SHAPES THE FINAL PRODUCT
A. Federal Proposals Prior to the 100th Congress
As a result of the economic recession in the early 1980's, the federal gov-
ernment increasingly recognized the seriousness of the plant closing and
mass layoff situation in the United States."' Legislators introduced bills to
address the problem in every Congress since 1973. However, until recently,
none reached the floor of either House." 2 Then-Senator Walter Mondale
first introduced legislation in the 93rd Congress that required creation of a
National Employment Relocation Administration to regulate plant closings
and relocations." 3 The bill required two years' advance notice of any deci-
sions that would dislocate as little as fifteen percent of the employer's
workforce." 4 Although quickly abandoned,"' the bill's basic intent often
appeared in future legislative proposals.
In 1979, Representative William Ford introduced the National Employ-
ment Priorities Act, which also imposed mandatory notification require-
ments on employers." 6 The bill proposed substantial protection for
employees and communities faced with a pending mass dislocation deci-
interfere with the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB and the bargaining process anticipated in
the National Labor Relations Act).
I II. The substantial number of government reports dedicated to the subject of plant clos-
ings and mass layoffs provides evidence of this concern. See, e.g., OTA SPECIAL REPORT,
supra note I; GAO REPORT, supra note 7; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10.
112. See OTA SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 41.
113. S. 2809, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1974) (bill to amend the Manpower Development and
Training Act to require prenotification of a plant closing to employees and communities). In
the next session, Rep. Ford introduced similar legislation that would have required prenotifica-
tion to employees and communities, but it would have also prevented federal support of em-
ployers implementing an unjustified dislocation. H.R. 13,541, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in Hearings Before General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor
o H.R. 13,541, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1-15 (1974).
114. S. 2809, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. It also imposed serious criminal and civil sanctions on
employers for noncompliance. Id.
115. 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 5016 (Jan. 8, 1975).
116. H.R. 5040, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979), reprinted in Hearings Before Subcomm. oil
Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor on? H.R. 5040, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5-70 (1980) (bill to require employers to provide employees six months to two years'
notice of a decision to close a plant).
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sion." 7 This legislation suffered defeat in the House Education and Labor
Committee. 1
8
More recently, Congress devoted closer attention to more moderate ap-
proaches addressing the problem. Representative Ford persisted in his
struggle to mandate advance notice by introducing H.R. 2847 in 1983.19
This bill generated a significant amount of debate when it emerged out of
subcommittee without amendment. 2 1 It required a lengthy advance notice
period of six months to one year, depending on the number of employees
affected.121 It mandated several employee benefits, including severance pay
and transfer rights. 12 2 The provisions also imposed employer liability for a
community's tax losses resulting from the dislocation. 2 3 Similar to previous
proposals, the bill subjected employers to possible criminal and civil
penalties. 1
24
During the same legislative session, the House Committee on Education
and Labor took a different approach to the plant closing issue and reported
out the Labor-Management Notification and Consultation Act.125 While re-
quiring a significantly shorter period of advance notice, the bill focused on
employer disclosure and consultation pending the closing or relocation.'2 6
It also provided unions with the ability to obtain injunctions in federal
117. Id. §§ 18-22.
118. 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 34,507 (Nov. 29, 1978).
119. National Employment Priorities Act, H.R. 2847, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), re-
printed in Hearings Before Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on
Educ. and Labor on HR. 2847, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 52-119 (1984) [hereinafter National Em-
ployment Priorities Act].
120. 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 35,033 (Jan. 26, 1984) (the bill emerged out of the House La-
bor-Management Subcommittee on Oct. 6, 1983).
121. National Employment Priorities Act, supra note 119, § 301(b)(3)(A)(i)-(ii). A loss of
employment equal to the lesser of 100 employees or 15% of the workforce within an 18-month
period triggered the notice requirements. Id. § 301(a).
122. Id. §§ 402-404.
123. Id. § 407.
124. Id. §§ 501-502. Violations could have resulted in fines of not more that $1,000 and
imprisonment for not more than one year. The bill also imposed a comprehensive system of
civil penalties in which employers who violated the terms of the provision would lose tax
deductions, credits, and depreciation allowances. Id. § 502.
125. H.R. 1616, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Hearings Before Subcomm. on Labor-
Management Relations and Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on
Educ. and Labor on HR. 1616, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-13 (1985).
126. Id. § 4. As stated in the terms of the bill, the employer was foreclosed from instituting
a plant closing or mass layoff until meeting and conferring with the employees' representative
"for the purpose of agreeing to a mutually satisfactory alternative to or modification of such
proposal." Id. § 4(A)(2). In addition, the employer was required to provide the employees'
representative with relevant information necessary to a comprehensive assessment of the pro-
posal. Id. § 5.
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courts to stay the proposed closing or layoff.'2 7 The intrusive nature of the
measure on employer autonomy caused its ultimate defeat.' However, the
true intent of the legislation, advance notice, garnered increased congres-
sional support and became an increasingly important objective. 129
B. Advance Notice Legislation in the 100th Congress
Responding to the Secretary of Labor's Task Force Report on Economic
Adjustment and Worker Retraining in a Competitive Society,' 3 ° Senator
Howard Metzenbaum introduced a much more moderate bill, The Eco-
nomic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act,'' as an amend-
ment to the Jobs Training Partnership Act (JTPA).3 2  Senator
Metzenbaum's bill also proposed a variable timetable for advance notice,
depending on the number of the employees affected by the closing or lay-
off.' 33 The bill included several exclusions from coverage and reduced the
amount of notice required under certain unforeseeable business circum-
stances. ' This legislation retained the employer's consultation and disclo-
sure requirements,' 3 5 but eliminated the earlier proposed criminal sanctions.
As a result, it imposed employer liability for back pay to workers for each
day of the violation and fines payable to the appropriate unit of local govern-
ment.' 3 6 Unlike the 1983 legislation, the bill eliminated all of the mandated
employee and municipality benefits.'
The Senate incorporated virtually the same provisions of Senator Metzen-
baum's bill into the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987 (Om-
nibus Trade Act).138 Passage of this legislation appeared to indicate success
in providing mandatory advance notice. However, while supporting the
Omnibus Trade Act as a whole, President Reagan vigorously opposed the
127. Id. § 6(b).
128. 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 35,016 (Jan. 24, 1986).
129. See 134 CONG. REC. S8454-55 (daily ed. June 23, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Metzenbaum).
130. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10.
131. S. 538, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in S. REP. No. 62, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 45
(1987) [hereinafter Adjustment Assistance Act].
132. 29 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Specifically, the bill replaced Subchapter
III, Employment and Training Assistance for Dislocated Workers, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1658
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
133. Adjustment Assistance Act, supra note 131, § 202(b).
134. Id. § 202(c).
135. Id. §§ 203-204.
136. Id. § 205.
137. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
138. H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S9384-85 (daily ed. July 8, 1987).
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mandatory advance notification provision, and vetoed the entire bill.' 39 He
objected to the concept of charging employers with mandatory foreseeability
of business conditions.' 4 ° The House overrode the veto.' 4 ' The Senate,
however, sustained it by a close margin. 142 In order to force the President to
act on the advance notice provision alone, House Speaker Jim Wright con-
ceived separating it from the Omnibus Trade Act, and thereby facilitated its
introduction again in 1988.'
C. Enactment of the WARN Act
Upon introduction, S. 25271" mirrored the previous proposal. However,
the debate in the Senate continued, and several amendments and substitu-
tions were defeated.' 4 5 Although ultimately modified before passage, the
amendments to the bill did not significantly affect the main provisions, but
instead clarified and altered its technical application.' 4 6 The House limited
debate on its consideration, and passed the bill without amendment. 14 7
When the legislation was delivered again to the President for signature, dif-
ferent political circumstances than those circumstances surrounding the
original rejection governed his decision. 148 His decision now included con-
siderations of the pending presidential election and the overwhelming level
of public support for enactment. 149 A veto at this juncture likely would have
139. President's Message to Congress on Veto of H.R. 3, 134 CONG. REC. H3531 (daily
ed. May 24, 1988).
140. Id.
141. On May 24, 1988, the same day as President Reagan's veto, the House overrode the
veto by a margin of 308-113. 134 CONG. REC. H3553 (daily ed. May 24, 1988).
142. The Senate sustained the veto on June 8, 1988, by a margin of 61-37. Id. at S7385
(daily ed. June 8, 1988).
143. See Reagan Bows to Politics on Plant-Closing Bill, CONG. Q. 2216 (Aug. 6, 1988).
144. 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S8869-70 (daily ed. July 6, 1988). According
to Senator Metzenbaum, sponsor of the bill, S. 2527, as introduced, "is identical, word-for-
word, comma-for-comma, to the plant-closing provision we passed in the omnibus trade bill."
Id. at S8375 (daily ed. June 22, 1988).
145. Throughout the Senate floor debate, over 75 amendments were considered. See 134
CONG. REC. S8501-02 (daily ed. June 23, 1988); id. at S8541, S8549, S8568 (daily ed. June 24,
1988); id. at S8598, S8610-11, S8620-21, S8626, S8639-40 (daily ed. June 27, 1988); id. at
S8665-66, S8669, S8671-72, S8679-81, S8683-84, S8686, S8689, S8697, S8719-21, S8727,
S8729-30 (daily ed. June 28, 1988); id. at S8820 (daily ed. June 29, 1988); id. at S8855, S8859
(daily ed. July 6, 1988).
146. For example, Senator Dole's amendment simply removed the natural disaster excep-
tion from within the unforeseeable business circumstances exception, providing an express ex-
ception for it. Amend. No. 2485, 134 CONG. REC. S8686-89 (daily ed. June 28, 1988). See
infra note 211 and accompanying text.
147. 134 CONG. REC. H5519-20 (daily ed. July 13, 1988).
148. See Auerbach, President Yields on Plant-Closing Bill, Wash. Post, Aug. 3, 1988, at Al,
col. 5.
149. Id.
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damaged his party's candidate, and forestalled congressional action on the
politically important trade bill.' 50 As a result, President Reagan let S. 2527
become law without his signature.151
The enactment of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act 152 signaled the end of a fifteen year struggle to provide workers with
advance notice of a plant closing or mass layoff. The political battle over the
legislation resulted in more moderate language, but the Act still retained the
original legislative intent of advance notice. 153 In fact, Congress indicated'
54
that the committee reports 55 accompanying earlier versions of the legisla-
tion reflect actual legislative intent. As enacted, the Act stands separate
from the JTPA.
1 5 6
During congressional debate, advocates noted the simplicity of its original
provisions. 1 57 But, as a result of extensive and politically necessary modifi-
cation, the final language became more technical and complex than origi-
nally intended.
151
III. THE WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT
A. The Notice Requirements
The WARN Act' 59 requires employers to provide sixty days' advance no-
tice to affected employees, state dislocated worker units, and local govern-
ments of a plant closing or mass layoff. 16' The Act's final version limited
150. Id.
151. The President exercised his option under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. In his announce-
ment, President Reagan said he acted in order "to end these political shenanigans and get on
with the business of the Nation." Statement on the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notifi-
cation Act, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 990 (Aug. 8, 1988).
152. Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109).
153. The preamble of the statute states its unrefined purpose: -[T]o require advance notifi-
cation of plant closings and mass layoffs, and for other purposes." Id.
154. 134 CONG. REC. H5504-05, H5510 (daily ed. July 13, 1988).
155. These include the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources Report on S.
538, S. REP. No. 62, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) and the Conference Agreement on the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987, H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
1045, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1547, 2078 [hereinafter Confer-
ence Agreement].
156. Conference Agreement, supra note 155, at 1045, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 2078. As a result, the statute operates independently from all other fed-
eral labor laws.
157. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. H5509 (daily ed. July 13, 1988) (statement of Rep. Ford).
158. See 134 CONG. REC. S8867 (daily ed. July 6, 1988) (statement of Sen. Matsunaga).
Senator Matsunaga stated: "The irony is that what complexity there is has largely resulted
from dilution of the original legislation, by creation of loopholes and qualifications, to make it
acceptable to opponents." Id.
159. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101-2109 (West Supp. 1988).
160. Id. § 2102(a). The Department of Labor (DOL) published its final regulations imple-
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coverage to those employers with 100 or more employees, 6 ' effectively ex-
cluding a substantial number of small employers from its requirements. De-
spite extensive opposition to any inclusion of layoffs within its coverage, the
sponsors of the Act retained mass layoffs in the final language.' 6 2 As a re-
sult, however, the final version does distinguish between these two forms of
dislocation.' 6 3 The magnitude of employment separations remains the focus
in either case. In the plant closing context, any shutdown of an operating
unit resulting in the dislocation of fifty or more workers at a single site of
employment within thirty days activates the notice requirement." The
mass layoff definition sets the threshold of employment losses at thirty-three
percent of the workforce and at least fifty employees at a single site of em-
menting the provisions of the WARN Act on April 20, 1989. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042 (1989) (to
be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 639). The rule clarifies and expands upon the language of the Act
to assist employers in compliance. Id. at 16,064 (to be codified at § 639.1). Contained therein
are procedural and substantive requirements for issuing notice, including the content and de-
gree of specificity. See id. at 16,068 (to be codified at § 639.7).
161. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2101(a)(1). "Employer" means any business enterprise or nonprofit
organization, except for certain government public service agencies. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,065
(1989) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(1)). Partially or wholly-owned subsidiaries and
independent contractors may also satisfy the definition of employer. Id. (to be codified at
§ 639.3(a)(2)). Such a determination will be based on several factors, including the existence
of common control, ownership, and operations. Id. Employees temporarily laid off or on
leave who have a "reasonable expectation of recall" are counted in determining whether an
enterprise employs the requisite number of employees. Id. (to be codified at § 639.3(a)(1)). In
addition, the regulations clarified that workers exempt from receiving notice under the tempo-
rary facility/project or strike/lockout exemptions are still counted in this determination. Id.
(to be codified at § 639.3(a)(3)).
162. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2101(a)(3).
163. Id. § 2101(a)(2)-(a)(3). A "mass layoff" determination is based solely on the number
of employees suffering an employment loss at a single site of employment, regardless of
whether the employer closes one or more lines or facilities within that site. 54 Fed. Reg.
16,065 (1989) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(c)(1)). In contrast, a "plant closing" in-
volves employment losses specifically resulting from the shutdown of any distinct operating
unit. Id. In either situation, the requisite number of employment losses resulting from em-
ployer action may be sufficient to trigger the notice obligation under WARN.
In determining coverage as either a mass layoff or plant closing, full-time employees not
entitled to receive notice because they fall under the temporary facility/project or strike/lock-
out exemptions are not counted. Id. (to be codified at § 639.3(c)(2)).
164. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2101(a)(2). An "operating unit" is defined as "an organizationally or
operationally distinct product, operation, or specific work function." 54 Fed. Reg. 16,066
(1989) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 639.30)). Only those employees experiencing an employ-
ment loss as a direct result of the shutdown of an operating unit are to be counted for purposes
of determining whether WARN Act obligations are triggered by the particular closing. Id. at
16,045 (explains final rule to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(b)).
In defining "single site of employment," DOL relied upon such factors as whether the plants
have interchangeable operational purposes and their geographical proximity. Id. at 16,066 (to
be codified at § 639.3(i)).
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ployment within a thirty day period.' 65 A layoff of 500 or more employees
triggers the notice requirement regardless of whether it meets the thirty-
three percent requirement. 166 In determining if the requisite number of em-
ployees have been dislocated, the statute aggregates all separations within a
ninety day period unless the employer demonstrates that the termination
events resulted from separate and distinct causes. 16 7
The Act provides employees, unions, and local governments with civil ac-
tions in the United States District Courts against employers for alleged vio-
lations of the notice requirement. 168 The employer's potential liability to
employees includes wages and benefits for each day of the violation, with a
sixty-day ceiling. 169 Local governments may recover $500 for each day of
the notice violation. 170
Congress also afforded courts broad discretion in fashioning this relief.17
Specifically, the courts possess discretion to reduce the judgment if satisfied
that the employer who violated the Act did so with the reasonable and good
165. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2101(a)(3).
166. Id.. § 2101(a)(3)(ii).
167. Id. § 2102(d); see also 134 CONG. REC. H5507 (daily ed. July 13, 1988) (statement of
Rep. Conte that clarifies separate action aggregation). An employer's duty to provide 60 days'
notice of a plant closing or mass layoff begins on the date of the first dislocation within the 30-
day period, providing that the requisite number of employees will be terminated within that
period. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,067 (1989) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(a)). Thus, to protect
against any violations of the Act, employers should be cognizant of the number of workers
dislocated in the previous 30 days as well as the number expected to be relieved in the next 30
days. Id. (to be codified at § 639.5(a)(1)(i)).
In addition, the provision for aggregation of dislocated employees may require employers to
look 90 days forward and backward. Id. (to be codified at § 639.5(a)(l)(ii)). In this context,
DOL further explained that the 90-day aggregation factor only comprises those employer ac-
tions "each of which" resulted in dislocation levels insufficient to meet the coverage threshold.
Id. at 16,053.
168. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2104(a)(5). It should be noted that these are exclusive remedies for a
violation of the Act's notice requirements. Id. Although the courts retain exclusive jurisdic-
tion, the Act also authorized the Secretary of Labor to issue interpretive regulations to assist in
interpreting its provisions. Id. § 2107(a).
169. Id. § 2104(a)(1). The violation period refers to the period of time following a shut-
down or layoff where notice was required but not provided. See Conference Agreement, supra
note 155, at 1052, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2085.
170. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2104(a)(3). The 60-day ceiling operates in this instance to limit em-
ployer liability to local governments to $30,000. See Conference Agreement, supra note 155, at
1053, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2086. The Conference Agree-
ment expresses the intention that courts may utilize factors such as the severity of the viola-
tion, the employer's size, and the employer's financial ability to satisfy the judgment in
determining the amount of penalty. Id. Employer liability to local governments may also be
relieved if the employer fully satisfies its liability to employees within three weeks from the
date of shutdown or layoff. Id.
171. WARN Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2104(a)(4).
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faith belief that their act or omission would not constitute a violation. 172
The Act also contains language that expressly denies courts' authority to
enjoin a plant closing or mass layoff. 173
In addition, the sponsors included a provision dictating that the WARN
Act supplements the rights of employees covered by similar law at the state
level or in their collective bargaining agreements.1 74  The Act explicitly
states that all the required notice periods run concurrently, not
consecutively. '
7 5
On its face, the Act appears simple and comprehensive. A close examina-
tion of the Act, however, reveals that its numerous exceptions and exclu-
sions dramatically diminish its utility.
176
B. Exclusions, Exceptions, and Reductions
On first impression, major provisions of the WARN Act appear to sub-
stantially limit an employer's ability to cease or relocate operations without
notice. However, provisions that exclude and except employers from the
notice requirements, or reduce the amount of notice required, drastically re-
duce the Act's application. The clearest exemption, for example, limits cov-
erage of the Act to employers with 100 or more employees.' 77 A recent
General Accounting Office study of plant closings and mass layoffs reported
that less than half of all such events were attributable to employers with 100
or more employees.' 7 8 Thus, without structural changes in dislocation
trends, the Act excludes a substantial number of employers. To this end,
Congress encouraged employers with less than 100 employees to abide by
172. Id. Attorney's fees may also be awarded as part of the costs to the prevailing party.
Id. § 2104(a)(6). This provision reflects Congress' intent to discourage frivolous lawsuits. Id.
House debate indicated that the court must in fact find the lawsuit frivolous and without merit.
See 134 CONG. REC. H5504 (daily ed. July 13, 1988) (statement of Rep. Ford); see, e.g., Chris-
tianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
173. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2104(b).
174. Id. § 2105. The Conference Agreement expresses the intent that other state laws and
collective bargaining provisions should not be disturbed by the provisions of the WARN Act.
See Conference Agreement, supra note 155, at 1054, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2087. The conferees expressly cited Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482
U.S. 1 (1987) (state severance pay statute not preempted by ERISA) as indicative of the de-
sired outcome when presented with a state law confronting the WARN Act. Conference
Agreement, supra note 155, at 1054, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
2087. However, the Conference Agreement also states that with respect to the length of no-
tice, any other provisions run concurrently with the 60-day provision in the Act. Id.
175. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2105.
176. See 134 CONG. REC. H5517 (daily ed. July 13, 1988) (statement of Rep. Bereuter).
177. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2101(a)(1).
178. See GAO BRIEFING REPORT, supra note 29, at 5 (table 1).
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the mandatory procedures set forth.'7 9 However, several other provisions
diminish the number of employers required to provide notice.
1. Exclusions and Exceptions: No Notice Required
First, the Act requires notice only in the event of an employment loss, as
defined therein. 180 Generally, an employment loss includes involuntary em-
ployment terminations (other than for cause or retirement), a layoff exceed-
ing six months, or a fifty percent reduction in hours during each of six
consecutive months.'' A subsection of the Act excludes circumstances
where technically no employment loss results from the change in business
operations.' 8 2 This includes situations where the employer sells all or part
of the business and the employees retain future employment rights in the
terms of the contract for sale.' 83 Also, an employer who relocates or consol-
idates need not provide notice if the employees are offered a comparable
position at a site within a reasonable commuting distance, or at any site if
the employee accepts the offer within thirty days. 184 The BLS Survey of
Permanent Mass Layoffs and Plant Closings in 1987 (BLS Survey) indicates
that this provision would apply to over six percent of the dislocation events
that occurred during that year.'8 5 Therefore, if the employer engages in a
179. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2106.
180. Id. § 2101(a)(6).
181. Id. According to DOL, an employment loss does not result when an employee is
transferred or reassigned to an employer sponsored retraining or job search program. 54 Fed.
Reg. 16,066 (1989) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(f)(2)).
182. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2101(b); see also S. REP. No. 62, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. V(b), at 23
(1987).
183. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2101(b)(1); see also Conference Agreement, supra note 155, at 1047,
reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2080. In the absence of such employ-
ment rights, this provision places the burden of providing notice to the employee on the seller
up to and including the date of sale, and on the buyer after that date. 134 CONG. REC. S8670
(daily ed. June 28, 1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 54 Fed. Reg. 16,067 (1989) (to be codified
at 20 C.F.R. § 639.4(c)). Because the obligation to provide notice always remains with the
employer, DOL encourages a pre-sale agreement between buyer and seller to provide advance
notice to those workers who may be dislocated as a result of the sale. Id. (to be codified at
§ 639.4(c)(2)).
184. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2101(b)(2); see also 54 Fed. Reg. 16,066 (1989) (to be codified at 20
C.F.R. § 639.3(f)(3)). Because the employer may be subject to liability if the employee does
not accept the offer within 30 days, DOL advises employers to include language providing 60-
days' advance notice within the transfer offer. Id. at 16,067 (to be codified at § 639.5(b)(4)).
185. This figure represents those businesses which underwent an ownership change or do-
mestic relocation. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PERMANENT
MASS LAYOFFS AND PLANT CLOSINGS IN 1987, 5 (table 3) (July 1988) [hereinafter BLS SUR-
VEY]. The BLS Survey is a product of a JTPA statutory provision which requires the Secre-
tary of Labor to maintain statistical information on plant closings and permanent mass layoffs.
29 U.S.C. § 1752(e) (1982). To accomplish this, the BLS developed the permanent mass layoff
and plant closing (PMLPC) program to coordinate data collection and publish a yearly report.
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sale or relocation and provides potentially affected employees with reason-
able employment opportunities in the future, then the dislocations do not fall
within the definition of employment loss.' 8 6
Second, the statute exempts employers from the notice requirement when
closing a temporary facility or upon completion of a specific project, if the
employees accepted their positions with knowledge of the limited duration of
their employment.' 87 The conference agreement accompanying the Omni-
bus Trade Act further defines this provision by requiring two findings before
it exempts employers from providing the requisite notice: that the employees
clearly understood that their jobs terminated upon completion of a particu-
lar activity, and that the project truly must be limited or temporary.' 88 The
BLS Survey indicates that temporary business activity accounted for over
fifty-nine percent of employer-instituted dislocation events in 1987.' 8 This
figure reflects plant closings or mass layoffs that resulted from contract com-
pletion, seasonal work and "slack work."' 90 While the survey defines slack
work as that which results from a nonseasonal decline in demand for prod-
ucts and services resulting in a layoff,' 9 ' the employer retains its exemption
if the employees knew of the contingent nature of their employment. In the
alternative, any unforeseeable circumstances leading to a mass layoff or clo-
sure may permit the employer to reduce the notice period as provided else-
where in the Act.
192
Third, the Act does not require notice when an economic strike or lockout
causes the closing or layoff.'9 3 It is Congress' intent that the legislation not
See BLS SURVEY, supra, at 90. The PMLPC survey is based on unemployment insurance
information received from state agencies that monitor the number of claims filed against busi-
nesses during a three-week period. When 50 or more employees of a particular establishment
file unemployment claims, the agency surveys that business by telephone to determine if a
plant closing or permanent mass layoff has occurred. Id.
186. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2101(b)(2).
187. Id. § 2103(1).
188. See Conference Agreement, supra note 155, at 1051, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2084. Whether the employee understood the temporary nature of
his employment relationship may be derived from the relevant "employment contracts, collec-
tive bargaining agreements, or employment practices of an industry." 54 Fed. Reg. 16,067
(1989) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(c)(2)). However, the employer bears the burden of
proof to establish that the temporary nature of the project or facility was communicated
clearly to the employee at the outset or at some point before the 60-day notice period. Id.
When it is unclear whether such an understanding exists, DOL advises the employer to clarify
the status of the employee in writing. Id. (to be codified at § 639.5(c)(3)).
189. See BLS SURVEY, supra note 185, at 5 (table 3).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 92.
192. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2102(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1988); see also infra note 204 and accompa-
nying text.
193. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2103(2). The Conference Agreement strictly interprets this provision,
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usurp NLRA provisions governing replacement of strikers.' 94 The Act's
sponsors advanced the notion that the provision does not grant additional
rights to strikers whom the NLRA considers legally replaced. 9 5 On the
other hand, illegal replacement of the workers could subject the employer to
liability for violating the notice requirements.' 96 Congress specifically in-
cluded a proviso that the Act will not affect judicial or administrative rulings
based on the NLRA.' 97 The BLS Survey found that two percent of busi-
nesses cited labor disputes as the reason for mass layoffs or closures.'9 "
2. Reduced Notice: Original Intent Narrowed Further
In addition to the exemptions and exclusions discussed previously, em-
ployers may legally reduce the notification period under the "faltering com-
pany ' "9 9 or the "unforeseeable business circumstances" exceptions.2"'
The faltering company exception applies to plant closings that are uncer-
tain at the outset of the normally required notice period based on the em-
ployer's potential ability to obtain needed capital or business to sustain
operations. 20 ' To rely on this provision, the employer must prove that it
diligently pursued the means to avoid or delay the closing, and that it rea-
sonably and in good faith believed that giving notice would have precluded
efforts to obtain the necessary capital or business.20 2 The conference agree-
ment expressed that this constitutes a narrow defense, and placed the burden
stating that employers may not rely on this exemption if their "lockout" is in effect a closing
for the purpose of circumventing the Act's requirements. See Conference Agreement, supra
note 155, at 1051, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2084. A lockout
occurs when an employer, as part of his collective bargaining strategy, refuses to use all or
some employees for performance of available work. Id.
194. See 134 CONG. REC. S8613-14 (daily ed. June 27, 1988) (clarifying message of Sen.
Metzenbaum, the floor manager of S. 2527).
195. See 134 CONG. REC. S8665 (daily ed. June 28, 1988) (clarifying discussion over
Amend. No. 2439 relating to the notice requirement's applicability to lawfully replaced eco-
nomic strikers).
196. See id. at S8663-64 (qualifying interpretation by Sen. Hatch).
197. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2103(2).
198. See BLS SURVEY, supra note 185, at 5 (table 3).
199. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2102(b). Although the term faltering company never expressly appears
in the language of the Act, the Conference Agreement uses the term. See Conference Agree-
ment, supra note 155, at 1048-49, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
2081-82.
200. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2102(b)(2)(A).
201. Id. § 2102(b)(1). DOL provides a four-part test that employers must satisfy in order
to rely on this exception. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,069 (1989) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(a)).
In addition, it states that this exception does not apply to mass layoffs and that the closing
must be assessed with regard to the entire business' financial status, not just the facility or site.
Id.
202. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2102(b)(1).
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of proof on the employer to satisfy these requirements.2 °3
Unforeseeable business circumstances may also except the employer from
providing the full notification period otherwise required, but the statutory
language is not self-defining.2 °4 The major ambiguity in this provision con-
cerns the definition of an "unforeseeable business circumstance. '20 5 The
conference agreement uses the terms "sudden, unexpected and dramatic" to
provide some guidelines in interpreting the term unforeseeable.2"6 Extensive
floor debate addressed this issue and offered specific circumstances as clarify-
ing examples of unforeseeable business circumstances.20 7 Congress, how-
ever, never articulated what would not constitute an unforeseeable business
circumstance.
Also, the terms of this section apply to situations where the layoff period
extends beyond the minimum six months.2 " This excepts those layoffs ini-
tially announced as less than six months, although circumstances later dic-
tate an extension of the layoff period.20 9 Such an action falls within the
coverage of the Act unless the employer qualifies for the unforeseeable busi-
ness circumstances exception.21 0
An amendment also removed the exception for businesses closing or lay-
ing off employees due to a natural disaster from the definition of unforesee-
able business circumstances, and expressly stated that such conditions
require no notice.21 However, in all provisions allowing the employer to
203. See Conference Agreement, supra note 155, at 1048-49, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2081-82. The report specifies that factors critical to the employer's
success are whether the employer was "actively seeking capital or business;" that the capital or
business "would have enabled the employer" to prevent the dislocation; and the employer
"reasonably and in good faith believed" that complying with the Act's requirements would
have precluded these efforts. Id. at 1048.
204. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2102(b)(2)(A). Examples of what might be considered "unforeseeable"
circumstances are the sudden loss of supplies from a major source, the termination of a princi-
pal client's contract, and an abrupt, disastrous economic collapse in the market for the product
or service. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,069-70 (1989) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b)(1)).
205. See 134 CONG. REC. S8855-56 (daily ed. July 6, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Wilson). Sen-
ator Wilson questioned the ambiguity in the phrase unforeseeable business circumstances: "My
quarrel with it is that it is not sufficiently precise. It leaves to someone a question of judgment
as to whether or not the circumstances that are raised by an employer as a defense against the
provisions of required notice were reasonably foreseeable." Id.
206. See Conference Agreement, supra note 155, at 1049, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2082.
207. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S8856 (daily ed. July 6, 1988) (Sen. Metzenbaum respond-
ing to inquiry about specific circumstances).
208. To trigger an employment loss within the Act's definition, a layoff must extend be-
yond six months. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2102(c).
209. Id.
210. Id. § 2102(c)(1).
211. Id. § 2102(b)(2)(B).
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reduce the notification period, the employer must provide the maximum
amount of notice feasible and supply a brief statement of reasons for the
reduction.212
The BLS Survey indicates that dislocations resulting from contract cancel-
lations, energy and weather-related disruptions, material shortages, plant or
machine repairs, and natural disasters account for over four percent of the
total layoffs or closures. 21 3 An additional two percent of surveyed employ-
ers cited reasons that would fall within the faltering company exception.21 4
C. An Intersection with the NLRA
Aside from provisions limiting coverage of the Act, employers' use of the
Act as a defense to violations of other federal labor laws presents further
interpretive questions.21 ' Specifically, the Act states that no violation of the
NLRA or Railway Labor Act (RLA) occurs when an employer provides the
required notice to employees. 216 Under this provision, a duty of good faith
accompanies the employer's action in complying with the Act's require-
ments.217 It appears that an employer could use notice of a closing or layoff
to threaten employees during a period of union organization or a representa-
tion election. 2 8 Floor debate on this issue dealt solely with whether an em-
ployer required to give notice under the WARN Act would violate its duty
to bargain collectively under the NLRA or RLA by doing so. 2 9 Good faith
compliance with the Act's requirements in these circumstances would not
constitute any violation. 22' Although Congress attempted to keep the Act
separate and distinct from other federal labor laws, some intersections will
probably occur. In this respect, courts will assume necessarily the task of
weaving some uniformity into national labor policy as a whole. 21
212. Id. § 2102(b)(3).
213. See BLS SURVEY, supra note 185, at 5 (table 3).
214. Id.
215. See 134 CONG. REC. S8665 (daily ed. June 28, 1988) (statement by Sen. Hatch dis-
cussing the impact on the NLRA).
216. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2108.
217. Id.
218. Currently, such threats to employees in an attempt to coerce them to reject union
representation, if proven, constitute unfair labor practices under § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982); see, e.g., NLRB v. Riley-Beaird, Inc., 681 F.2d 1083
(5th Cir. 1982).
219. See 134 CONG. REC. S8613-14 (daily ed. June 27, 1988); id. at S8865-66 (daily ed.
June 28, 1988). Under the NLRA, the employer's duty to bargain extends to issues concerning
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). For a
review of this duty, see supra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
220. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2108.
221. See Hartley, The Framework of Democracy in Union Government, 32 CATH. U.L.
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WARN ACT: WILL THE EXCEPTIONS
SWALLOW THE RULE?
A. Effective Scope of Coverage
When the data from the BLS Survey are aggregated, it appears that sixty-
seven percent of the businesses implementing plant closings and mass layoffs
in 1987 cited reasons that would have excluded them completely from cover-
age of the Act.222 Arguably, an additional six percent could have reduced
the notice period.223 In all of these situations, the employer seeking an ex-
clusion or reduction would have borne the burden of verifying its reasons for
the closing or layoff, if challenged. However, if the employer satisfied the
exclusion or reduction requirements of the Act, only twenty-seven percent of
the plant closings and mass layoff events would have required the full sixty
days' advance notice.2 24 Whether this figure will remain constant depends
largely upon future litigation.
B. Mandatory Advance Notice: Is It an Illusory Concept
Under the .WARN Act?
Initially, the number of exclusions and exceptions available to employers
under the WARN Act severely limits its application. 25 Because many of
these provisions contain open-ended language, however, the opportunity ex-
ists to manipulate further the intended coverage of the Act.226 Certainly, the
exception for unforeseeable business circumstances provides a notable exam-
ple of this ambiguity.227 Initial examination of this provision and the ac-
companying legislative history evidences the unclear extent of its
REV. 13, 120 (1982) (noting the role of the judiciary when confronted with situations where
coexisting federal labor laws apply).
222. This figure reflects the 59% who would be able to apply for the exclusion under the
temporary facility/completion of project exception, the 6% in the sale or relocation exception,
and the 2% who closed or permanently laid off employees as a result of a strike or lockout. See
supra notes 185, 189, 198 and accompanying text.
223. This figure reflects those employers who could qualify for the faltering company ex-
ception and those with unforeseeable business circumstances. See supra notes 213-14 and ac-
companying text.
224. Id. This figure represents the employers remaining after subtracting the 73% with
arguable cases for exclusion or reduction. Id.
225. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
226. Members of Congress already anticipated the potential for litigation. See 134 CONG.
REC. H5517 (daily ed. July 13, 1988) (statement of Rep. Bereuter noting the diminished utility
of the final language). Solicitor of Labor George R. Salem recently noted the interpretive
difficulties inherent in the language of the WARN Act and its "tremendous potential for very
expensive litigation." Litigation Over Plant Closing Law Forecast by Labor Solicitor Salemn.
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 211, at A-14 (Nov. 1, 1988).
227. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
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application. 2
Also, based on the large number of employers citing the temporary
projects and facilities exemption as the reason for their closing or layoff, it
appears that the exemption will be the subject of a significant amount of
future litigation.229 Here, the operative inquiries of whether the employees
had knowledge of their temporary employment, and whether the project or
facility is in fact temporary, require factual determinations.2 3 ° Thus, both
factors are open to expansive interpretation.
The faltering company exception provides a complex test that may or may
not be easily interpreted. 23' Thus, the degree of the burden on employers to
satisfy the exception's requirements remains speculative. In fact, it becomes
difficult to fathom a situation in which an employer who closes a plant or
reduces employment levels without providing notice does not have an argua-
ble case for an exclusion, exemption, or reduction of the amount of notice
required.
The utility of the Act becomes further diminished when combining the
above-mentioned limitations on coverage with the sanctions that may be im-
posed for violations of the Act.232 When an employer balances the potential
losses from maintaining operations at current levels against the potential
costs of litigation, the employer's decision to provide notice may be based
simply on cost-effectiveness.23 3 If the employer ultimately discovers that the
latter course of action is more beneficial, the employer's incentive to comply
with the Act is reduced substantially or even eliminated.23 4
228. Id. The Conference Agreement suggested that determinations with respect to this
provision require a focus on the employer's business judgment. See Conference Agreement,
supra note 155, at 1049, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2082. DOL
expanded the Conference Agreement language by concluding that "Ithe employer must exer-
cise such commercially reasonable business judgment as would a similarly situated employer in
predicting the demands of its particular market." 54 Fed. Reg. 16,070 (1989) (to be codified at
20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b)(2)).
229. Recall that 59% of the employers surveyed by the BLS cited this as the reason for
their closing or layoff. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
232. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2104 (West Supp. 1988). An employer's liability for daily wages and
benefits to employees not receiving the required notice is reduced by payments made to such
employee or to a third party. Id. § 2104(a)(2). Courts also have authority to limit employer
liability. Id. § 2104(a)(4).
233. Before passage of the Act, Professor Joseph Singer questioned whether employer in-
centives within the Act were sufficient to ensure compliance. Singer, The Reliance Interest in
Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 614, 735 n.388 (1988).
234. Id.
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C. Judicial Interpretation: The Final Mark- Up Session
Because the sole enforcement mechanism lies within the federal courts,235
they will assume a position of importance in interpreting the provisions of
the Act comparable to that of Congress in legislating it. When confronted
with the question of whether an employer effectively removed itself from the
requirements of the Act or lawfully reduced the amount of notice it pro-
vided, the courts will be allowed a significant opportunity to inject policy
considerations into their decisions. These policy judgments will likely affect
the balance struck in the Act between the rival interests of business and
labor.2 36 To this extent, it is imperative that the courts rely on the principle
objectives Congress sought to achieve in enacting the WARN Act.2 37
Although these objectives are expressed in its language, they may also be
found in the extensive legislative history accompanying the Act.23 8
A broad reading of the already extensive exclusions and exceptions of the
Act's coverage would clearly frustrate the primary purpose of the Act-
mandatory notice.2 39 A narrow construction would further the congres-
sional intent to provide workers and communities with advance notice of
plant closings and mass layoffs. 24
V. CONCLUSION
Plant closings and permanent mass layoffs reflect a common characteristic
of the turbulent American economy. Employees and communities tradition-
ally negotiated these abrupt transitions without a significant opportunity to
adjust. As a result of these negative experiences, many became unwilling
and unable to accept and cope with the changes.
The WARN Act attempts to alleviate the negative consequences of plant
235. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2104.
236. At the outset of the decade, one commentator predicted: "The battle over plant clos-
ing controls may well set the tone of labor-management conflict in the new decade." B. BLUE-
STONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 42, at 242 (quoting Cook, Laws to Curb Plant Closures,
INDUSTRY WEEK, Feb. 4, 1980, at 41).
237. In Wirtz v. Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463 (1968), the United States Supreme
Court found extrinsic factors particularly useful when construing congressional labor legisla-
tion. Justice Brennan stated: "[S]uch legislation is often the product of conflict and compro-
mise between strongly held and opposed views, and its proper construction frequently requires
consideration of its wording against the background of its legislative history and in the light of
the general objectives Congress sought to achieve." Id. at 468.
238. Id.
239. See Conference Agreement, supra note 155, at 1048, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2081. The Conference Agreement language regarding the faltering
company exception provides an example of express congressional intent to narrowly construe
the scope of the exceptions. Id.
240. Id.
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closings and mass layoffs by mandating advance notice of such a decision.
Clearly, that represents the original intent of its sponsors. However, provi-
sions that exclude or exempt employers from coverage, or reduce their notifi-
cation period, severely diminish the mandatory nature of the Act.
Moreover, because of the unclear language defining these exceptions, the
scope of the Act's coverage remains open to interpretation.
The WARN Act's sole enforcement mechanism - resort to a civil suit -
guarantees that the federal courts will ultimately define the reach of
mandatory advance notification. In doing so, the courts should take into
account the tremendous benefits that could be realized by such protection.
They should also consider the commitment that Congress displayed in fi-
nally enacting the legislation over a presidential veto.
More important, the courts should recognize that the statutory language
reflects a balance between the competing interests of business and labor.
Pragmatically, Congress realized the potential burden on employers result-
ing from unqualified mandatory advance notice, and yet remained commit-
ted to mandatory notice. Congress therefore focused on those situations
where notice is, in some way, possible. The compromise, crafted after more
than a decade of political debate, should not be disturbed by the courts.
Rather, the courts should enforce that compromise by narrowly interpreting
the exceptions to the mandatory notice provisions of the WARN Act.
Christopher P. Yost
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